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Introduction
The hopeful plans for currency convertibility drawn up ten years
ago at the Bretton Woods Conference have long been buried under
the weight of the so-called dollar shortage which accompanied post-
war reconstruction, the Korean crisis, and the first years of Western
rearmament. The year 1953 witnessed, at long last, a fundamental
and spectacular readjustment in the world's payments pattern. From
gold and dollar deficits of nearly $11 billion in 1947, foreign coun-
tries moved gradually to an actual surplus, before aid, of nearly $1
billion in 1953. Their gold and dollar holdings—including United
States aid receipts—dropped by nearly $6 billion in the three years
1946—1948, but have risen since by $8 billion, of which $2.6 billion
was accumulated in 1953 alone.
National and international plans for currency convertibility have
thus become again, for the first time in many years, a practical policy
issue. The problem was raised here, on the initiative of the United
Kingdom, a little more than a year ago, but the British suggestions
were received with a surprising lack of enthusiasm in this country,
in continental Europe, and even in Britain. The discussion of the
plan soon revealed fundamental disagreements about the very mean-
ing of' convertibility under present economic and political condi-
tions.
The Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, under the able
chairmanship of Clarence B. Randall, devoted considerable atten-
tion to the issues involved. Its report,1 issued last January, has done
much to clarify the intiniate relationship between the trade and the
payments aspects of international convertibility. In the meantime
the British plan was discussed further in the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic cooperation (OEEC) and at the Commonwealth
Conference in Sidney. Important steps toward the broadening of
currency transferability and the relaxation of dollar restrictions have
1Reportto the President and the Congress, Commission on Foreign Economic
Policy, 1954.
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also been taken in recent months by a number of major countries,
particularly the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands.
The United States recession and the Congressional debate on the
Randall report induced a wait-and-see attitude that slowed down
the adoption of even more spectacular decisions, both nationally
and internationally. There is little doubt, however, that such deci-
sions will soon be forthcoming, and that they will be vitally influ-
enced by the long-overdue clarification of United States policies.
The 1953 British Plan and the Randall Report
The plan presented by the British last spring rested essentially on
a distinction between convertibility for residents and convertibility
for nonresidents. The United Kingdom proposed to restore the con-
vertibility of sterling earned in current transactions 2bynonresidents
of the sterling area, but to retain the right, for the United Kingdom
as well as for other sterling area countries, to impose restrictions on
all foreign transactions of their own residents. These restrictions
could, of course, be imposed in order to limit the foreigners' sterling
earnings and the drain on the area's gold and foreign exchange re-
serves which might attend the conversion of such earnings into non-
sterling currencies, particularly dollars. They could, moreover, be
imposed on a discriminatory or even bilateral basis to restrict un-
ports from the countries presenting "excessive" demands for con-
version and to favor imports from the countries which retained their
earnings in sterling or made use of them to expand their purchases
from the area itself. The proposal was made conditional upon a sub-
stantial liberalization of United States trade policies and the graüt-
ing of large stabilization loans or lines of credit to the United
Kingdom by the International Monetary Fund and by the United
States.
The major criticism leveled against the plan, both here and
abroad, was that its adoption might well stimulate a new wave of
trade restrictions, discrimination, and bilateralism. The Randall re-
port agreed with this criticism and indicated that the Commission
"would deplore a merely formal convertibility maintained through
2Theexclusion of convertibility for capital transactions has become generally
accepted since Bretton Woods as a permanent feature of postwar convertibility
plans. The practical wisdom and feasibility of this exclusion raises very complex
issues which I shall make no attempt to discuss here. It might be noted, however,
that the International Monetary Fund's example was not followed by the Agree-
ment for a European Payments Union, which applies equally to all transactions
among members, whether on current or capital account.
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trade restrictions. It believes that the removal of restrictions upon
trade and upon payments should go hand in hand."3
The continental European countries were particularly fearful of
the implications of th.e British plans for the OEEC trade liberaliza-
tion program and the European Payments Union. The Randall Com-
mission expressed a similar concern about dismantling prematurely
the most effective instrument for trade liberalization and currency
transferability established so far: "The Union has achieved an im-
pressive measure of success—above all, it has shown that freeing
trade and freeing payment go hand in hand—and the Commission
feels that it should not sponsor any measures that might wreck the
Union before there is something better to put in its place."
These criticisms may spring in part from an overpessimistic view
of the external position of Britain and of the world's so-called "dollar
shortage."In the absence of heavy balance of payments pressures,
the current trend toward trade liberalization might be expected to
develop even without formal commitments, and to be strengthened
further by the proposed measures for currency convertibility.
Yet the possibility of renewed balance of payments difficulties—
whether in Britain or in other countries—cannot be excluded. Under
such circumstances formal convertibility for nonresidents, unac-
companied by parallel commitments with respect to trade policy,
might force a relapse into restrictions, discrimination, and bilateral-
ism and destroy the progress already achieved toward a multilateral
system of trade and payments.
After all, the proposed sterling convertibility a]ready exists for
residents of the United States and other "American accpunt" coun-
tries. Sterling earnings accruing to such residents are freely con-
vertible into dollars. Any other country that wi.shes to is also free to
refuse payment in inconvertible sterling, and to demand gold or
dollar payment for its exports. Most countries are deterred from do-
ing so by the realization that such a policy would generally expose
them to tighter restrictions on their exports to sterling area countries,
similar to the restrictions now applied by these countries against im-
ports from the dollar area. Sterling convertibility for nonresidents
is certainly not regarded as true convertibility by the United States
exporters who already "enjoy" this status, and it is certainly not
sought by other countries' exporters to whom this "privilege" is now
denied.
These considerations explain the coolness with which the British
3Reportto the President and the Congress, p. 73.
Ibid., p.74. See below, pp.391 if.
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plan was received in continental Europe, in the United States, and
even by a large sector of British opinion. While the plan has not
been formally amended, numerous indications exist that opinion is
gradually shifting, in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, toward a
position fairly similar to that expressed in the Randall report. To be
meaningful, convertibility must apply to trade as well as payments,
to residents as well as nonresidents. This implies that progress can
only be gradual and must depend on the fulfillment of certain pre-
requisites. "The Commission does...wishto emphasize its view
that a strong internal economy, willing and able to control its money
supply and its budget as safeguards against inflation, sufficiently
mobile to make the best use of its resources, and able and willing
to save in order to increase its productivity and improve its competi-
tive position in world markets, is a prerequisite to convertibility;
and that the attainment over time of these conditions should be the
guide as to how rapidly full convertibility could safely be ap-
proached."6
These "prerequisites to convertibility" constitute, indeed, an awe-
some list, especially if they are viewed not only as once-and-for-all
prerequisites for the restoration of convertibility, but also as perma-
nent prerequisites for the maintenance of convertibility after it has
been restored. Will any future lapse from internal strength auto-
matically spell the collapse of convertibility for the country con-
cerned? And how will the failure of some countries to reach or
maintain convertibility affect the prospects for the achievement or
preservation of international convertibility? "The Commission be-
lieves that the decisions, the methods, the timetable, and the respon-
sibility for introducing currency convertibility should rest on the
countries concerned. It recognizes, however, that currency
bility must be examined in the light of the policies pursued by other
countries, particularly the United States." The Commission thought
also that the restoration of convertibility by Britain would greatly
facilitate—or even be necessary for—its restoration by other coun-
tries, and would in turn be greatly eased "if some other of the major
trading countries [were] able to make their currencies convertible
simultaneously with sterling."
The Randall report thus seems to contemplate the unilateral res-
toration of convertibility by each country, acting in isolation, but also
recognizes the interdependence among the various countries' deci-
6Reportto the President andtheCongress, p. 73.
Ibid.,pp. 72—73. 8 ibid.,p. 74.
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sions and policies, particularly those of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and other major trading countries. The recognition of this
interdependence is in happy contrast with the naïve theory which
still prevails in academic and business circles, and which long dom-
inated the United States Treasury thinking, i.e. that convertibility
merely depends on each country's "setting its own house in order"
by stopping inflation, readjusting its exchange rate, abolishing trade
and exchange controls, and requiring full gold or convertible cur-
rency settlement for its exports and other external transactions. Even
a country as strong internally and externally as Switzerland still feels
unable to adopt such a prescription and run the risk of generalized
discrimination against its exports.
International currency convertibility cannot be restored and—
even more important—maintained without the active participation
and cooperation of the major trading countries. While this participa-
tion and cooperation could largely be taken for granted in the nine-
teenth century, they cannot be ensured today by mere unilateral
decisions, but require at least a minimum of collective organization
and mutual commitments.
Before discussing the nature of these commitments, we must clar-
ify the meaning of currency convertibility as an international policy
objective. We shall then discover that the necessary commitments
are far less formidable than the "convertibility prerequisites" which
are listed in the Randall report, and which, indeed, no international
agreement could ever be relied uppn to enforce effectively.
Toward a Definition of "Workable" Convertibility
Currency convertibility used to be defined by the maintenance of
a fixed parity or exchange rate with relation to gold or gold-converti-
ble currencies. But the modern proponents of convertibility argue
in favor of flexible or "floating" exchange rates as against fixed or
"pegged" rates. The reason for this shift is, of course, obvious. The
fixity of exchange rates becomes largely illusory if it is preserved
only through trade or exchange restrictions which control arbitrarily
the access of traders to foreign exchange for each category of trans-S.
actions, and may deny them the right to purchase it at any rate
whatsoever. Exchange stability has little or no meaning if it is not
based on exchange freedom. The latter was taken for granted in all
traditional definitions of convertibility. True currency inconvertibil-
ity—as distinct from instability of exchange rates—is a relatively
381iNTERNATIONAL CURRENCY AND RESERVE PLANS
modern phenomenon. It might be noted, for instance, that European
currencies remained convertible throughout the 1920's, even though
at a fluctuating exchange rate.
Here again, the Randall report marks definite progress over previ-
ous policies, and particularly over the exaggerated emphasis placed
on exchange rate stability at Bretton Woods. The Commission ex-
pressed itself as "sympathetic to the concept of a 'floating rate',
which provides alternative methods of meeting trade and exchange
pressures."
This seems to leave us with the elimination of trade and exchange
restrictions as the modern definition of convertibility. The question
arises at once whether any full elimination of such restrictions is
conceivable within a foreseeable future, and whether such liberaliza-
tion can realistically be confined to direct, quantitative restrictions
while leaving tariff restrictions to the full discretion of each individ-
ual country. There are undoubtedly very important differences be-
tween tariff restrictions and other trade or exchange restrictions.
Most of these differences relate, however, to the domestic impact of
such measures upon income and money flows. From the point of
view of their international impact, the differences between tariffs
and trade controls are not so fundamental as to justify the definition
of convertibility in terms of a full elimination of the latter without
any concern for the first. High and unstable tariff levels can indeed
be as damaging to international trade as moderate, nondiscrimina-
tory systems .of import or exchange controls, or more so.
Shall we therefore be pushed into a definition of convertibility
which equates it to the old free trade ideal of classical economists?
In this case, progress will indeed have to be gradual, and full con-
vertibility is unlikely to reward our efforts or even those of our chil-
dren and grandchildren.
Clarity of thought and effectiveness of policy both require a less
ambitious definition of immediate convertibility goals. Such a defini-
tion can be found in the restoration of a multilateral system of trade
and payments, rather than in the removal of all protection for. do-
mestic production against imports from abroad. This was indeed the
meaning of nineteenth-century convertibility, which accommodated
itself to varying degrees of national protection. The major differ-
ences between these age-old techniques of protection and modern
inconvertibility techniques lie in the fact that the former extended
protection only to the national producers and only within the pro-
tecting country's boundaries, while the latter discriminate in favor
p.78.
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of certain exporting countries at the expense of others, and try to
protect domestic producers not only within the country's boundaries
but in all foreign markets as well. Once adopted by a major country,
such techniques inevitably spread from trading partner to trading
partner, each country trying to secure special advantages to itseff
or being forced at least to defend its exporters against the discrim-
inatory actions of others. International trade is then forced more
and more into the strait jacket of bilateral negotiations, which push
all considerations of price or quality competition and the underly-
ing pattern of comparative costs and advantages into the back-
ground.
The key to "workable" convertibility is not free trade—desirable
as this would be—but the maintenance of full competition in third
markets. MacDougall's study of United States and United Kingdom
exports in 1937 showed ample verification for the classical theory of
comparative costs, but found that it depended essentially on third
market competition rather than on direct trade between the two
countries. ccBefore the war, American weekly wages in manufactur-
ing were roughly double the British, and we find that, when Amer-
ican output per worker was more than twice the British, the United
States had in general the bulk of the export market, while for the
products where it was less than twice as high the bulk of the market
was held by Britain.... Butwhile in the normal text-book exam-
ples the exports of each country go to each other, the great bulk of
the exports of the United States and the United Kingdom in 1937
went to third countries—more than 95 per cent of British exports of
all our sample products but three, more than 95 per cent of Amer-
ican exports of all the products but six. It is true that each country
was nearly always a net exporter to the other of products in which
it had a comparative advantage, but this is of limited interest, since
trade between them was in general a negligible proportion of their
total consumption." 10
Thusthe preservation—or restoration—of traditional competitive
forces in international trade depends essentially on the equal access
of all foreign exporters to each national market, rather than on the
elimination of all protection for domestic producers within a coun-
try's own territory. The latter objective has never been achieved, and
can hardly be expected ever to be fully achieved without a political
as well as economic merger among the countries concerned. Equal
10C.D. A. MacDougall, "British and American Exports: A Study Suggested by
the Theory of Comparative Costs," Part I, Economic Journal, December 1951,
pp. 697—724, particularly pp. 697—699. See also below, Table 3, col. 4.
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access to third markets has always constituted the bulk and the core
of international competition.
Convertibility is not incompatible, therefore, with a certain
amount of protection and restrictions. The past is, in this case, a
guide to the future. The restoration of convertibility depends essen-
tially on the elimination of discrimination and bilateralism—rather
than of over-all protection or restrictions—from the trade and pay-
ments mechanism. This implies: (1) the ability of country A to use
its earnings from countries B, C, D, etc., to settle its deficits with
countries X, Y, Z, etc., i.e. full currency transferability; (2) the ab-
sence of bilateral or discriminatory trade techniques designed to
shift trade artificially from low cost exporters to high cost exporters,
thus distorting normal competitive forces not only between domestic
and foreign producers, but in all third markets as well.h1
The two problems are largely inseparable, because payments and
trade techniques reinforce one another in this respect and can often
be used almost interchangeably to achieve the same result.
The weakness of the International Monetary Fund springs in large
part from the artificial separation of these two problems—one of
which was entrusted to the Fund, and the other to the General
Agreements on Tariff and Trade—but even more from basic defects
of the Fund's machinery for dealing with currency transferability.
Countries may borrow from the Fund, but they cannot use the Fund
to convert their earnings from one country into the currency needed
to settle their deficit with another. Moreover, the Fund has in prac-
tice made little or no attempt to distinguish between exchange re-
strictions and discrimination. Organized discrimination against a
"scarce currency" is theoretically provided for under Article VII of
the Fund Agreement, but this provision has never been tested by the
Fund. On the other hand, Fund members have so far retained the
right to currency discrimination—against weak as well as against
hard currencies—under Article XIV of the Agreement. Similar dis-
crimination is also contemplated as a permanent feature of the
Agreement under Article VIII, although its use under this article
would be subject to Fund approval.
In contrast, the remarkable success achieved by the European
Payments Union is largely explainable by its comprehensive ap-
proach to the problem, encompassing full multilateralism both in
trade—nondiscrimination—and in payments—currency transferabil-
ity. This multilateralism, however, is confined to the relationships
11Thisdefinition is very close to that proposed in Staff Papers, Commission on
Foreign Economic Policy, 1954, pp. 467—468.
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among member countries, and does not cover their trade and pay-
ments with other countries and particularly with the United States.
Partial convertibility with the United States dollar is provided in
EPU settlements, but each country is left free to regulate as it wishes
its trade and payments with nonmember countries.'2
Most of the difficulties which the EPU has had to meet in its four
years of operation, and most of the objections raised against it, are
closely related to these regional limitations of the Agreement. These
were, however, unavoidable at the time the Agreement was nego-
tiated. While they are probably unnecessary and even harmful under
present conditions, thefr elimination might prove dangerous in the
event of a renewed dollar scarcity, as it might then contribute to the
unnecessary spread of deflationary forces and to an ultimate relapse
into generalized bilateralism.
The Prerequisites of Convertibility
Convertibility has been defined above as the absence of discrim-
ination, and particularly of discriminatory bilateral action, with
respect to both trade and payments. While indispensable to the
maintenance of international competition, such a system is also sub-
ject to a major defect. It tends to spread to the world at large any
deflationary pressures arising from an economic depression or from
trade restrictionism in one of the major trading centers. If each of
the countries most heavily and directly affected by the decline in
this center's imports adopts nOndiscriminatory policies—internal de-
flation, currency devaluation, over-all trade or exchange restrictions,
etc.—to restore equilibrium in its balance of payments, it will affect
unfavorably the balance of payments of other countries. These may,
in turn, be compelled to adopt similar policies—or to reinforce them
—thus contributing to the spiraling of deflation, devaluation, or re-
strictions. This process will continue until the first country's surplus
is ultimately eliminated, but will involve a multiple restriction of
world trade_or an extensive devaluation of currencies—which
might have been avoided by direct and systematic discrimination
against the surplus country alone. For this alternative to be success-
ful, however, discrimination by the deficit countries must be directed
exclusively against the over-all creditor country, rather than against
12Paymentsto and from nonmember countries of the sterling area are, how-
ever, channeled through the United Kingdom's account, and are subject to the
same settlement rules as are applicable among members. The same applies also
to all other sterling transfers.
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the countries in bilateral surplus with them, since such bilateral
creditors may themselves be in over-all deficit rather than in over-all
surplus. If discrimination is left to the discretion of each individual
country, acting in isolation, it will inevitably take the form of bi-
lateral discrimination and involve even worse distortions—and,
probably, a greater contraction—of world
This was recognized in the "scarce currency" clause of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, but the practical implementation of such
a clause would raise enormous difficulties. Public opinion in the
scarce currency country is likely to pay little heed to the intricate
economics of the problem and to react violently against the ganging
up of other nations against its exports. The danger of retaliatory
action will deter many countries from participating in systematized
discrimination. This is all the more likely because such discrimina-
tion might involve the imposition of tight restrictions against essen-
tial imports from the scarce currency country while unessential
imports from other countries continue to be imported freely. Coun-
tries can hardly be expected to sacrifice their own national interests
in this manner for the sake of an abstract concept of international
equilibrium. Certainly, the exact degree of implementation required
from each participant would give rise to endless debate and contro-
versies.
A more practical approach to the scarce currency problem lies in
the extension of nondiscrimination over the widest possible area, on
the basis of mutual agreements and commitments, rather than in
any international quarantine of the major creditor country. The EPU
experience reveals very clearly the type of commitments necessary
for the effective functioning of a multilateral trading area. The cred-
itor countries must facilitate the adoption by the debtors of nondis-
criminatory readjustment policies:
1. By not hampering such policies through unnecessary trade or
exchange restrictions over their own imports (such liberalization
commitments were accepted by all EPU members, but were ex-
ceeded in practice by the surplus countries)
2. By providing fractional financing to cushion moderate deficits
18Anabundant literature has grown up around this problem and its appli-
cability to the so-called "dollar shortage." See, in particular:
E. M. Bernstein, "Scarce Currencies and the International Monetary Fund,"
Journal of Political Economy, March 1945, pp. 1—14
Ragnar Frisch, "On the Need for Forecasting a Multilateral Balance of Pay-
ments," American Economic Review, September 1947, pp. 535—551
John H. Williams, Trade Not Aid: A Program for World Stability, Harvard
University Press, 1953
386INTERNATiONAL CURRENCY AND RESERVE PLANS
of other members with inadequate reserves, thus allowing them to
ride out temporary fluctuations in their balance of payments, or to
wait for the effect of more slowly acting fiscal or monetary readjust-
ment policies
3. By avoiding retaliatory action against countries which may be
compelled to restore restrictions temporarily because of heavier
deficits, provided that:
a. Such restrictions remain nondiscriminatory as among members
b. The restricting country submits its case to full discussion by
the competent organs of the OEEC, with discussion to cover
• not only the external measures adopted, but the whole range
of monetary, fiscal, and economic policies of the country con-
cerned
From Regional Convertibility to International Convertibility
Such a close type of cooperation is hardly feasible on a world-
wide basis. It is possible only among countries which are highly
interdependent (exports to the EPU area account for nearly three-
fourths of member countries' exports), keenly conscious of their
interdependence, and able to understand each other's problems and
policies. These factors—different in degree, but not in kind, from
those underlying a fuller political union—explain the success of,
and justify the need for, regional cooperation in trade and payments.
The maintenance of freer trade among members constitutes, of
course, a form of discrimination. Such discrimination, however,
rooted in mutual commitments of the type described above, may be
as justified by its broad political and economic results as the dis-
crimination against imports from abroad, and in favor of interre-
gional imports, implicit in present boundaries between nations. The
progressive elimination in the nineteenth century of internal taxes
on the movement of goods between cities or provinces of the same
country presents a hopeful pattern for freer movement of trade
among countries ready to accept mutual trade and financial commit-
ments limiting the untrammeled use of their economic sovereignty.
Under the inflationary strains of postwar reconstruction, the ster-
ling area and EPU arrangements provided a practical alternative, not
to a better and wider system of international convertibility, but to
the infinitely worse alternative of generalized bilateralism in trade
and payments. They could not, however, provide a satisfactory an-
swer to the fundamental disequilibria then prevailing between these
regions and the outside world and, particularly, to their trade and
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payments problems with the dollar area. In the sterling area the
responsibility for handling these problems centered largely on the
United Kingdom, through the administration of the dollar pool and
the setting up of different types of sterling accounts—American and
Canadian accounts, transferable accounts, resident sterling accounts,
bilateral accounts, etc.—subject to different privileges and limita-
tions as to their transferability in payments. In the EPU no such
centralization was attempted, and each country was left free to
handle its own trade and payments with nonmember countries. On
the other hand—and in contrast to the exclusive use of sterling in
settlement among sterling area countries—the partial gold or dollar
payments involved in EPU settlements established a direct link be-
tween the positions of individual EPU countries within and outside
the EPU area.
Such a system may tend to stimulate discrimination against an
outside scarce currency, but also tends—contrary to a widely spread
misconception—to eliminate discrimination if no such scarcity exists.
The stimulus to discrimination arises from both the payments and
the trade rules governing the system. EPU creditors are forced to
liberalize imports from other EPU members, but are left free to
maintain—or liberalize—restrictions on imports from the outside.
Since, however, they receive also partial gold or dollar payment for
their EPU surpluses, they may be unable to finance large deficits
with nonmembers requiring 100 per cent gold or dollar settlements.
Even if their gold and dollar position enables them to do so, they
may be alarmed by the continued growth of their EPU lending and
adopt restrictions on outside imports, in order to force their residents
to shift their purchases to EPU sources and thus reduce their rate
of lending to the Union.
Debtor countries, on the other hand, will normally prefer to incur
their deficits with the Union, rather than with other countries, since
deficits with the Union require only partial gold and dollar payment
and are, for the remainder, financed by EPU credits. These credits,
however, are limited in size. When a country remains persistently
in deficit with the Union, its ratio of gold to credit settlements rises
steadily until the point of 100 per cent gold settlements is reached.
When this occurs, the financial stimulus to discrimination disap-
pears, and the deficit country becomes increasingly reluctant to ad-
mit freely less essential, or costlier, imports from EPU sources while
continuing to restrict severely more essential or cheaper imports
from the outside. On the other hand, such persistent deficits on the
part of some members are reflected in persistent surpluses on the
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part of others. The creditors become increasingly reluctant to con-
tinue to extend larger and larger credits beyond their quotas. Since
the Union, under these circumstances, is receiving 100 per cent gold
settlements from the extreme debtors, its convertible resources tend
to increase and to enable it to grant additional payments to the cred-
itors either through a larger ratio of gold to credit settlements, or
through some amortization of their previously accumulated claims.
The experience of the EPU so far confirms these theoretical de-
ductions. Of the $1,350 million of EPU credits initially available to
them, present members have used about $1,150 million and have
therefore only about $200 million in all left available. For many
months, France, Turkey, and Greece have been subject to 100 per
cent gold settlements and have claimed release from their trade
liberalization commitments. Restrictions were also restored by the
United Kingdom as long as its quota was exhausted or remained
perilously close to exhaustion, and it will be remembered that, for a
while, the United Kingdom also accepted sterling payment for dollar
commodities bought through London. On the creditors' side, sub-
stantial amortization payments were granted to Belgium and Portu-
gal in June 1952, and proposals now under discussion envisage both
an increase in gold settlements beyond quotas and the regular
amortization of long-outstanding claims.
This normal evolution of the Union toward convertible settle-
ments and nondiscrimination can be held in check, in the long run,
only by a severe and generalized dollar scarcity. 'When this exists,
most members will be anxious to preserve their exports against the
tighter restrictions applied to dollar trade, an.d will recognize that
this can be done only through mutual trade liberalization .and the
limited convertibility of intra-EPU settlements. When, however, the
dollar position of a majority of members becomes more comfortable,
the maintenance of discriminatory trade and payment rules is in-
creasingly regarded not only as contrary to their own selfish inter-
ests, but also as unnecessary from the point of view of the group as
a whole. It should be noted, for instance, that the EPU management
has always prodded• excessive debtors to readjust their deficits
through monetary and fiscal policies. Exchange readjustments have
sometimes been hinted at too, but with a discretion imposed by
common sense as well as by the desire to avoid any conflict of
jurisdiction with the International Monetary Fund. These pressures
had a considerable influence on member countries' policies, particu-
larly in the case of Germany and the Netherlands. They were rein-
forced in the first case by a special loan negotiated on the basis of an
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agreed readjustment program, but at no time has the EPU seriously
entertained any proposals for further credit extensions to deficit
countries which did not take adequate steps to readjust their hal.
ance of payments.
We may conclude, therefore, that while formal commitments to
nondiscrimination and currency transferability are most likely to
prove feasible on the basis of regional cooperation, such arrange-
ments will tend de facto toward world-wide nondiscrimination and
convertibility, except when discrimination against a "scarce cur-
rency" becomes the only alternative to the international spread of
deflation or of bilateralism.
Even in the latter case the maintenance of currency transferabil-
ity and nondiscrimination among membe.r countries preserves pow-
erful competitive pressures upon the higher cost countries. It pre-
vents them from seeking in bilateral trade and payments agreements
an escape from basic economic readjustments. They can no longer
extract from their creditors bilateral import credits or discrimination
in favor of their exports. Moreover, the gradual liberalization of
trade restrictions among members opens each market to the compe-
tition of the lower cost producers in the area, and fundamentally
influences the readjustment of national price and cost patterns, in-
dispensable to further progress toward world-wide, rather than
merely regional, convertibility. There is little doubt that full compe-
tition with Belgian, Swiss, German, and other exporters over the
whole 'EPU area has exercised upon higher cost producers a pressure
equivalent, or nearly equivalent, in most cases to that of competition
from nonmember countries.
This is confirmed by the near elimination of currency discounts
and gold premiums in the European free markets, and by the ease
with which major steps toward trade liberalization and broader cur-
rency transferability have been absorbed in recent months. The
abolition of rationing, the reopening of international commodity
and gold markets in London, the merging of practically all nonresi-
dent sterling accounts—outside the dollar area—into a single trans-
ferable account system, the adoption of a similar system for Deutsche
mark accounts, the liberalization of many categories of dollar im-
ports and other transactions in Cermany and the Netherlands, etc.,
have already narrowed considerably the gap between regional and
international convertibility. There is every indication today that the
remainder of the gap could be bridged if some method could be
found to assuage current fears about the existence, or future resur-
gence, of a world-wide dollar scarcity.
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International Inflation and the Dollar Shortage
A "currency scarcity" condition—i.e. the tendency for many coun-
tries to incur convergent deficits toward a single "scarce currency"
country—may emerge from many different causes. A number of
writers have popularized the view that a higher rate of technical
advance in the United States tends to create a chronic dollar short-
age. The possibility of such a link cannot be flatly denied on purely
logical grounds. The demonstration of its inevitability or probability
depends, however, on highly special assumptions as to the exact
nature of such productivity advances, and as to their impact on
prices money wages, terms of trade, the income elasticity of
import demand, etc. It would not be difficult to construct extremely
plausible models of United States advances in productivity whose
impact would be to reduce, rather than increase, the balance of
payments surpluses of the United States, without exercising any
generalized deflationary pressures on foreign prices, export levels,
economic activity, or employment.
TABLE 1
Estimated Gold Reserves and Dollar Holdings of Foreign Countries
(dolkirsin billions)
192819381948
1953 ASPER CENT OF:
1953192819381948
Continental WesternEurope$4.8 $7.3$5.8$10.1207%138%172%
France 2.03.0 .8 1.152 35 132
Switzerland .2 .91.9 2.11,080 280 112































States $8.7 $13.8 $18.4$26.4300%190%143%
Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1954, p. 245.
A dollar shortage undoubtedly tends to emerge, however, when
the United States economy develops lesser inflationary pressures,
or greater deflationary pressures, than the rest of the world. This
timeworn doctrine still seems to me sufficient to explain the tendency
of European countries to run into heavy dollar deficits during a
period of intense inflationary pressures associated with war financing
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and the reconstruction of war damage, or in the courseofa world
depression marked by steeper price and income deflation in the
United States than in most other industrial countries.
I find it extremely difficult, however, to discover any chronic dollar
shortage in the current pattern of world payments. Foreign coun-
tries' gold reserves and dollar holdings are estimated to have in-
creased by about $8 billion in the last five years and by $2.6 billion
in the year 1953 alone. Table 1 shows that foreign gold and dollar
holdings are far higher today than in any previous period. While
still inferior to 1938 levels in real purchasing power, they are also
probably far better distributed with relation to most countries' im-
port levels and export instability than at any time in the recorded
past.
The fears of a dollar shortage spring from the special factors un-
denying the present pattern of the balance of payments of the world
with the United States, and particularly from:
1. The dependence of foreign countries' current dollar earnings
on large and "abnormal" United States expenditures for foreign
aid and military procurement overseas
2. The expected increase in their dollar needs if present restric-
tions and discrimination on dollar transactions were eliminated.
by the restoration of convertibility
3. The possible impact of a United States depression on their
levels of reserves, foreign trade, and economic activity in gen-
eral
THE ROLE OF "ABNORMAL" UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES ABROAD
The 1953 accumulation of gold and dollars by foreign countries
far exceeds their total receipts of United States aid.'4 Even the
further curtailment of United States military disbursements overseas
would leave Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere in ap-
proximate gold and dollar equilibrium, but would leave the rest of
the world with a deficit of about $1.7 billion (see Table 2).
Adding to this an estimated $.6 billion for stockpiling purchases,
the Randall report discerns in these figures a "concealed dollar gap
of some $2 billion to $3 billion annually, which would be increased
if there were a change in the economic situation, such as a recession
14 Other than so-called military-end-use items contributed in kind by the United
States under military aid programs. This form of aid and the corresponding
United States exports have been excluded throughout from the data presented in
this paper, since there is every reason to assume that such items would not be mi-
ported in significant quantities by foreign countries under circumstances per-
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here or a deterioration in Western Europe's terms of trade. On the
other hand, it should be recognized that major parts of our 'ex-
traordinary' expenditures abroad are connected with our defense
effort, and that the Western European countries' own defense pro-
grams affect adversely their trade position, by increasing their es-
sential imports and by absorbing resources that would otherwise be
available for expanding their exports." 15
Theconstant references to Western Europe in these comments
suggest that the commission was not aware that its "concealed dol-
lar gap" concentrates almost entirely on the Far Eastern countries—
particularly Japan—whose economies have been disrupted by mili-
tary events and geared to a high rate of United States military
procurement. It is, of course, obvious that these countries are not
now accumulating gold and dollar surpluses equal to whatever the
United States army spends there for procurement of goods and serv-
ices, plus the amounts of reconstruction or defense support aid to
Korea, Nationalist China, etc. This becomes a "concealed dollar
gap," however, only if one assumes that such expenditures are
likely to be completely eliminated in time, without any correspond-
ing offsets in foreign countries' dollar imports or exports.
Both assumptions would be extremely unrealistic. United States
military disbursements overseas are still rising now and will at best
taper off gradually, with little or no probability that they will fall to
zero in the foreseeable future. Moreover, such tapering off would
simultaneously release for consumption, investment, or exports the
resources otherwise absorbed in the production of the goods and
services contributed under these programs. This trend would be
further reinforced by the decline in foreign countries' own military
budgets that would be likely under such circumstances.
Absorption of these resources into civilian production will, of
course, require difficult economic readjustments. For Western Eu-
rope as a whole, the problem is more likely to center on the mainte-
nance of domestic activity and employment than on the balance of
payments itself, since its current gold and dollar accumulation is
already as large as the total of aid and military disbursements re-
ceipts (see Table 2 above). In the Far East, however, the readjust-
ments will bear more heavily on the need to reduce imports or
increase exports, and these readjustments might spread to other
areas and recreate generalized balance of payments difficulties with
the United States if the decline in United States military expendi-
15Reportto the President and the Congress, p. 5.
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tures were not offset in part by some increase in United States com-
mercial imports or capital exports. Given the present rate of gold
and dollar accumulation by foreign countries ($2.7 billion), however,
moderate changes in United States export and import levels would
be sufficient to absorb any foreseeable reduction in United States
aid and military disbursements.
THEROLEOF DOLLAR DISCRIMINATION
The removal of discrimination against dollar trade constitutes a
second factor of fear and uncertainty in the progress toward convert-
ibility. The Randall Commission Staff Papers report that "guesses
at the magnitude of the suppressed dollar demand have ranged be-
tween $1 billion and $3 billion a year; the true figure at present is
probably much closer to the former than to the latter."I am in-
clined to reduce even further the estimates of the real quantitative
impact of dollar discrimination upon the balance of payments.
First of all, we must not forget that more than half of the United
States exports flow to such areas as Canada, Central America, the
Caribbean Islands, the northern coast of South America, Japan, the
Philippines, etc., which either have no exchange controls at all
(Canada and most of Central America) or which have no reason to
apply discriminatory controls against dollar goods as such.
Second, the proportion of United States and Canadian exports
in total imports of the rest of the world is now already far larger
than before the war. This is true not only for the world at large,
but for all individual areas as well, with the single exception of
the sterling area. The proportion is about one-third larger than in
1937 for Latin American and continental EPU countries, and 20
per cent larger for the countries outside the sterling area, conti-
nental EPU, and Western Hemisphere.
Third, while the elimination of dollar discrimination will tend
toward an expansion of United States exports, two other factors
are now acting in the opposite direction. The reduction in foreign
aid eliminates some elements of discrimination in favor of United
States shipping and commodities previously purchased under the
ECA, MSA, or FOA procurement authorizations. Moreover, the
recovery of production and the abatement of inflationary forces
abroad reduce foreign demand for other United States goods im-
ported in abnormal quantities in earlier years. It should be noted
that the proportion of United States and Canadian goods in the
StaffPapers, p. 18.
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total imports of Western Europe and the sterling area has declined
substantially over the past year, in spite of greater dollar availa-
bilities and of the trend toward a relaxation of dollar discrimination
abroad. The continuation of this trend, in a noninflationary environ-
ment, might well result primarily in price readjustrnents by soft
currency exporters, rather than in any large diversion in the pat-
tern of trade. This would be all the more likely if progress toward
nondiscrimination were undertaken simultaneously by all major
trading countries rather than by one or a few countries alone.
For all these reasons the relaxation of trade and currency dis-
crimination against dollar goods is likely to have a much more mod-
erate impact on the dollar position of foreign countries than is
generally feared. In any case, the relatively small order of magni-
tude of its possible effects shOuld be kept in mind. For instance, a
25 per cent increase in United States exports to the sterling area—
where discrimination is most stringent and effective—would amount
to about $375million,and a 10 per cent increase in exports to
continental Western Europe and the nondollar countries of Latin
America to about $250 million and $100 million, respectively, i.e.
a total of about $700 million a year.
THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF A UNITEDSTATESRECESSION
The international impact of a United States recession could hardly
be estimated in advance with any degree of precision. It may be
noted, however, that the mild recession experienced since the sum-
mer of 1953 has had a far smaller impact on foreign dollar incomes
than was generally expected. Cold and dollar holdings continued
to rise at a rate of more than $2 billion a year throughout the
period October 1953—March 1954. Current and prospective levels
of foreign aid and military expenditures—at a rate of $4.3 billion
a year—will continue for some time to act as a powerful stabilizing
influence on foreign countries' dollar earnings. For the next two or
three years at least, a United States recession might be expected
primarily to slow down the current accumulation of gold and
dollars abroad, but itis highly unlikely to resurrect any large
surpluses in the United States balance of payments with the rest
of the world.
The international impact of United States recessions, however,
is not limited to direct trade between each country and the United
States itself. Their major disruptive effects lie in the transmission of
contractive forces from country to country, through their own mu-
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tual trade as well as through their trade with the United States.
The channels through which these indirect effects are propa-
gated are of several kinds:
1. The demand of each country for exports from other coun-
tries—and not only from the United States—may contract auto-
matically as a consequence of the lower income levels resulting
from:
a. The loss of export earnings to the United States.
b. Possibly, the deterioration in its terms of trade associated
with a United States recession.
2. This will affect income levels in the supplying countries and
react in turn on their own imports from the first, spreading the
contraction from each country to the others.
3. This spiral of contractive tendencies may be broken, or on the
contrary accentuated, by the economic policies adopted in each
country:
a. Some countries may succeed, through compensatory policies,
in preventing a decline in national income levels and main-
taining their import demand at a higher level; their balance of
payments will tend to deteriorate as a consequence, reduc-
ing previous balance of payments surpluses or causing a drain
on their monetary reserves.
b. Some countries may impose currency depreciation, tariff in-
creases, or import and exchange restrictions as either (1) the
consequence of reserve losses, whether automatic or resulting
from the compensatory policies above, or (2) a substitute
for such compensatory policies, in order to offset through in-
creased exports and decreased imports the effects of the re-
cession on economic activity, incomes, and employment. Such
restrictions would aggravate the difficulties of other countries.
The international propagation and intensification of a. United
States recession can be considerably reduced by measures which
will encourage and enable countries to follow compensatory poli-
cies (3a above) rather than disruptive policies (3b above) in the
course of such a recession. The difficulties of the task will be far
smaller if action is taken at an early stage rather than after the
recession has been permitted to spread over a wider and wider area.
The direct impact of a United States recession will be heaviest
on the countries most dependent on the United States market for
their exports. Canada arid Latin American countries sell in the
United States market about half of their total exports, while Euro-
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pean and sterling area countries trade far more extensively with
one another and sell only about 10 per cent of their total exports
to the United States (see Table 8). This ratio is substantially ex-
ceeded by only a few countries outside the Western Hemisphere—
mainly the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and Japan.It varies
greatly, however, among individual Latin American countries,
from about 25 per cent in the River Plate countries to more than
80 per cent in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia.
TABLE S
Cold and Dollar Holdings, Total Exports, and Exports to the the United States in 1953
(dollars in billions)
PER CENT
PER CENT RATIO OF
































































Sources: Cold and dollar holdings: Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1954, p. 245.
Total exports: International Financial Statistics, April 1954, pp. 22 and 24.
Exports to the United States: SurveyCurrent Business, Dept. of Commerce, March
1954, pp. 22—28.
A 30 per cent decline in exports to the United States would there-
fore have a very different significance for these various countries
or areas. It would correspond to only S per cent of over-all exports
and 7.5 per cent of gold and dollar holdings for continental West-
ern Europe, but to about 16 per cent of total exports and 31 per cent
of gold and dollar holdings for Canada.
There are also very great variations in the cyclical sensitivity of
different countries' exports to the United States. Sterling area ex-
ports have usually been affected far more severely and those of
Canada substantially less severely, than those of other areas dur-
ing past United States recessions. Exporters of wool (Australia,
New Zealand, Argentina, Uruguay), minerals (Bolivia, Chile, Mex-
ico), and raw materials in general suffer a far heavier decline than
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exporters of coffee, bananas (Brazil, Colombia, Central America),
sugar, and other foods.
Taking into account both criteria—ratio of exports to the United
States to total exports or GNP, and sensitivity of those exports to
United States recessions—we should expect the most severe direct
repercussions of a United States recession in some Western Hemi-
sphere countries—particularly Canada, Mexico,Bolivia,Chile,
Argentina, and Uruguay—and in Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia,
and the overseas sterling area.
TABLE 4















Canada —4 ... —65 —35 —2
Latin America +1 —8 —68 —32 .
Other countries a —8 ... —87 —34 —6
Total —5 —6 —70 —35 —7
a ExcludingEastern Europe.
International policies designed to avoid or moderate the further
spread and spiraling of the depression fall into two major cate-
gories: monetary policies and trade policies.
Untied loans in convertible currencies—whether from interna-
tional institutions or from high reserve countries—may be necessary
to relieve these countries of severe balance of payments pressures
and enable them:
1. To avoid deflationary or restrictionist policies which will ag-
gravate the depression elsewhere
2. To adopt positive compensatory domestic policies designed to
sustain income levels, employment, and imports
The amount of assistance required for this purpose will depend,
of course, on the level of these countries' reserves. Current ratios
of gold and dollar holdings to total exports now average 40 to 50
percent for all major regions except-the sterling area (see column
5ofTable 3 above). Sterling area and EPU arrangements, however,
result in a considerable economy of gold and dollar settlements in
intra-area trade. As long as these arrangements continue, the need
for external stabilization loans will be considerably less than it would
otherwise be for Western Europe and the sterling area. The resources
of the IMF in gold and United States dollars—more than $3 billion
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—and in the currencies of other prospective creditors could provide
all, or at least a considerable portion, of the residual assistance
needed and actually usable to overcome the reserve deficiencies
arising from a United States recession.
The latter qualifications, however, limit considerably the signifi-
cance to be attached to international monetary cooperation as an
antirecession device. Such cooperation may be more effective in pre-
venting deflationary or restrictionist policies than in stimulating
positive compensatory policies. The latter policies would prove very
difficult to implement for many of the countries most severely
affected by a United States recession, even if large stabilization
loans relieved them of any anxiety about their reserve losses and
balance of payments deficits. It is by no means easy to provide al-
ternative employment for the men and resources left idle by the
loss of export markets, especially in countries highly specialized in
one or a few export products, such as tin, copper, and rubber.
Moreover, the ability of these countries to repay at a later stage
the loans extended to them may very often be questioned by the
prospective lenders. The lenders may take the view—rightly or
wrongly—that balance of payments difficulties are aggravated dur-
ing the recession, and will persist long after the end of the reces-
sion, as the result of ill-advised or irresponsible domestic policies.
Disagreements on such points are likely to prove a stumbling block
in many cases, especially when decisions have to be made—as is
the case in the IMF—by many countries with diverse geographical,
historical, and economic backgrounds. They may create far lesser
difficulties in more closely knit organizations, such as the EPU and
the sterling area, which group countries more highly interdependent
economically, more keenly conscious of such interdependence, and
more familiar with one another's problems and policies. While
stabilization loans are a useful antirecession device, their limitations
should be recognized and should prompt further efforts in other
directions as well.
Commodity agreements and buffer stocks designed to reduce ex-
cessive instability in agricultural and raw material markets would
be of far greater value to primary producing countries than mone-
tary stabilization loans. The difficulties raised by such schemes are
enormous, but so are their potentialities for economic stabilization
and development.'7 One must regret, therefore, the rather cursory
dismissal of this approach to the problem in the Randall Com-
mission's report. Some of the Commission's recommendations, and
See Commodity and EconomicDevelopment,United Nations, 1953.
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particularly the "avoidance of actions incidental to our own com-
modity control and stockpile programs that would have avoidably
disruptive effects upon world prices" 18and"continued consulta-
tion and cooperation with other nations to improve knowledge of
world supply and demand for materials and food-stuffs, and to ex-
plore possible means of lessening instability," 19areall to the
good, but give little hope for concrete action in the near future.
This conclusion is clearly shared by the Commission itself, which
also recommends "a policy of encouragement of diversification of
the economies of the countries now excessively dependent upon a
small number of products." 20Thebenefits of international speciali-
zation must, to this extent, be sacrificed to the objective of domestic
economic stability. In practice, however, the costs and difficulties
of diversification policies may well be as formidable as those of
commodity stabilization, or more so.
The above measures will at best reduce, but not eliminate, the
direct impact of reduced earnings from exports to the United States
on the monetary reserves and economic activity of the countries
affected. They should be coupled with other policy commitments
designed to avoid, to the maximum extent, the adoption of beggar-
my-neighbor policies of currency devaluation, tariff increases, trade
and exchange controls,discrimination, and bilateralism, which
are a major factor in propagating and intensifying international re-
cessions. The cooperation of the major and stronger nations is
particularly vital in this respect. The influence of their policies on
other countries, and their ability to use alternative measures to
fight depressive tendencies at home, are usually far greater than
those of the smaller or less developed economies.
No country, however, can be expected to renounce any means to
improve its own domestic activity and employment, even at the
expense of others, on the basis of Platonic appeals to international
cooperation. While each may realize that the cumulative effect of
mutual restrictions will be damaging to all, none will feel assured
that its own restraint, or lack of restraint, in this respect will de-
cisively influence the policies of other cuntries. Mutual commit-
ments, of a positive as well as of a negative nature, encompassing
credit provisions together with trade provisions, remain the most
promising way to promote the maximum degree of trade freedom
and cooperative antirecession policies. International agreements of
the International Trade Organization or CATT type deserve greater
Reportto the and the Congress, pp. 35—36.
19 ibid.,p. 36. 20 ibid.,p. 36.
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United States support than they have received in recent years. On
the other hand, in this field as well as in the monetary field, regional
organizations may develop a far closer degree of intimate coopera-
lion among the participating countries than can be anticipated on
a world-wide scale. The combination of trade, credit, and economic
policy commitments and negotiations into a single institution can
also contribute to greater success in all three fields, as the OEEC
experiment has amply demonstrated during itsbrief span of
years. We thus rejoin the conclusions reached in the previous dis-
cussion of the best means to restore and preserve convertibility in
a world of national sovereignties. Regional cooperation should be
viewed as a valuable adjunct, rather than a rival, of world-wide
agreements.
The current of gold and dollar accumulation in Western Eu-
rope and the sterling area, together with prospective rates of United
States aid and military expenditures overseas over the next few years,
provide a considerable cushion against a hypothetical United States
depression. We should therefore expect a cOntinuation, and even an
acceleration, of the progress already achieved in recent years and
months toward currency transferability and trade liberalization.
These, however, are fair weather objectives which can be pressed
forward only in an environment of high economic activity and em-
ploymei-it. In limes of depression each nation will almost inevitably
resort again to trade restrictions and currency inconvertibility in
an effort to insulate its own economy from external deflationary pres-
sures. These policies cannot be successful in the end, as each coun-
try's actions tend to aggravate the difficulties of others, widening
and the contractionist tendencies at work. National
antidepression policies of this character have always proved in the
past one of the main factors in the spread and aggravation of
international recessions.
This spiral can be broken only by collective arrangements giving
operational meaning to the interdependence of the various coun-
tries' policies. The avoidance of disruptive action should be made
both possible and attractive through adequate access to stabiliza-
tion assistance in case of need and through reciprocal guarantees
against all unnecessary recourse to trade and exchange restrictions.
Where restrictions become unavoidable, they should be limited
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in scope and time, and unilateral discrimination against any
country participating in the arrangements should be shunned.
International cooperation of thissortis,however, extremely
difficult to negotiate and implement in practice. Moderation in its
aims, hopes, and promises is indispensable to avoid later disillusion-
ment, disaffection, and retrogression. Negotiation and implementa-
tion of world-wide arrangements are particularly slow and cumber-
some, and such arrangements will necessarily remain more limited
in their effective content than regional arrangements among coun-
tries which are highly interdependent, keenly aware of this inter-
dependence, and readier to understand each other's problems and
policies and to confide in the commitments and good faith of their
partners.
Both types of approach should be developed and encouraged, and
the potentialities of each should be as fully exploited as proves
possible in practice. Much could be done today to improve the
effectiveness of world-wide organizations such as GATT or the
IMF. Much could be done also, under present favorable circum-
stances, to relax some of the regional limitations of the EPU and
sterling area systems. Individual countries—particularly Britain,
Germany, and the Netherlands—have recently taken important
measures in this direction, but drastic revisions in the EPU Agree-
ment to adjust it to the enormous changes which have taken place
in the international pattern of trade and payments since the nego-
tiation of the Agreement, four years ago, are now long overdue.
Major creditor nations—and especially the United States—will
inevitably exercise a profound influence on the progress of other
countries Sand of both regional and international organizations to-
w'ard currency convertibility and trade liberalization. The United
States has a major stake, economically and politically, in the pro-
motion of liberal economic policies abroad and in the strengthening
and development of other free nations. These objectives happily co-
incide with the interests of both consumers and producers in the
reduction of tariff and trade barriers here, and with the need to
provide increasing outlets for our exports of goods and capital.
The obvious shortcomings of the Randall Commission's report
as a basic document on fundamental, long-termUnited States inter-
national economic policy have attracted more attention in aca-
demic circles than its very real contribution to the clarification
of urgently needed, and immediately feasible, United States ac-
tion in the monetary and trade field. The adoption of its major
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recommendations would provide the necessary spark for further
and considerable advances toward the rebuilding of a workable
international framework for economic growth and stability.
COMMENT
WILLIAM A. SALANT, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
Triffin has performed a remarkable feat by presenting a discussion
of the international trade and payments problem that is at once
brief, comprehensive, and fresh. His principal conclusions, as I see
them, are:
1. The international payments situation is now far better balanced
than at any previous time in the postwar period, and far better
balanced than is often realized, especially by those of us who have
become so accustomed to a state of "dollar shortage" that we have
come to regard it as a permanent feature of the economic land-
scape.
2. The steps required to achieve an effective multilateral sys-
tem of trade and payments—"workable" convertibility, as Triffin calls
it—are far less formidable than those required to reach what might
be called "perfect" convertibility.
3. Such a multilateral system, if attained, would be a precarious
fair weather system unless supported by international commit-
ments and facilities designed to prevent it from collapsing at the
first gusts of adversity.
With these major conclusions I am in hearty agreement. My com-
ments will represent, on the whole, not disagreements but rather
elaborations or qualifications of Triffin's argument, elaborations or
qualifications which, in some cases, he might well have inserted
himself if time and space had permitted.
Triffin has adopted the view that convertibility, to be meaningful,
must apply in some sense to the sphere of trade as well as to that
of payments. He has concluded, however, that we must reconcile
ourselves to some element of protection of national markets, and he
is unwilling to accept the principle that tariffs are permissible
while quantitative restrictions are beyond the pale. Accordingly,
he has defined as his goal the elimination of discrimination and
bilateralism in trade and payments alike. This approach emphasizes
the elimination of discrimination in the application of import re-
strictions, rather than reduction of the level of those restrictions.
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Now a country which restricts its "hard currency" imports more
drastically than its"soft currency" imports can eliminate that
discrimination in either of two ways (or by some combination of the
two): it can relax the more severe restrictions, or it can tighten up
the less severe ones. Either course of action will result in nondis-
crimination and therefore satisfy Triffin's criterion of "workable"
convertibility.
This formulation of the problem may well be open to the inter-
pretation, certainly not intended by Triffin, that either route to non-
discrimination in trade restriction is equally desirable, or to the
less extreme interpretation that "workable" convertibility, achieved
through the second route, the tightening up of the less severe im-
port restrictions, is more desirable than inconvertibility. If free-
dom from restrictions is regarded as desirable, the first and more
extreme interpretation can be dismissed at once, but the second
merits some discussion. I doubt the desirability of convertibility if
it must be attained at the cost of leveling up import restrictions.
The point is not academic, as further examination will indicate.
Assume a country with an inconvertible currency, which maintains
severe import restrictions against countries with convertible cur-
rencies, and more liberal ones against other inconvertible countries.
(This assumption describes; with varying degrees of accuracy, the
actual present position of most of the EPU members and many
other countries.) The country now makes its currency convertible in
the sense that nonresidents who earn it through legal currpnt trans-
actions are permitted freely to convert their earnings into any
foreign currency.'
At this point, if the authorities took no further action, their cur-
rency would be convertible only in the strictly financial sense; they
would not have attained "workable" convertibility because they
continue to discriminate against imports from other convertible
countries. This situation, however, is inherently unstable, because
the distinction between "hard currency" and "soft currency" im-
ports disappears as soon as the currency becomes convertible, and
the authorities therefore lose any balance of payments reason to
'For example, if the currency in question were sterling, a French wine mer-
chant (or, alternatively, his central bank) would he permitted to convert the ster-
ling proceeds of his exports to Great Britain into dollars or any other currency he
chose. In the following paragraphs the term "convertibility" will be used in this
sense, which is of course narrower than Triffin's "workable" convertibility, since
it applies only to currency arrangements, not to nondiscrimination in trade re-
striction. Convertibility in Triffin's sense will be referred to explicitly as
ableconvertibihty.
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discriminate unilaterally against imports from convertible coun-
tries.2
The authorities of the newly convertible country can take any
of three courses of action with respect to their import restrictions
(or any combination of the three):
1. They can eliminate discrimination by liberalizing the restric-
tions against countries with convertible currencies.
2. They can eliminate discrimination by tightening up the re-
strictions against countries with inconvertible currencies.
3. Despite the point just made, that the balance of payments
incentive to discriminate disappears when the currency becomes
convertible, they may nevertheless make no change in their import
restrictions; that is, they may continue to discriminate. The rationale
of this possibility will be discussed below.
It is possible to offer some general observations about the cir-
cumstances in which each of these courses of action is likely to pre-
dominate. If a country makes its currency convertible at a time
when it, as well as other inconvertible countries, is suffering from
a "shortage" (in some relevant sense) of convertible currencies, it is
entirely likely that the establishment of convertibility will be followed
by a tightening of import restrictions as between the newly con-
vertible country and the remaining inconvertible ones. Some of
the relevant criteria of "dollar shortage" are (1) unsatisfactory
balance of payments and reserve position, (2) lack of access to
substantial international credits or reserves, and (3) high suppressed
demand for dollar imports which is dammed up behind the dis-
crimirlatory import restrictions. If these symptoms of dollar short-
age are present, a newly convertible country which liberalized its
restrictions against hard currency imports could expect its pay-
ments position to deteriorate on two counts: its hard currency im-
ports would increase, and its exports to inconvertible countries
would decline as they began to treat it as a hard currency source
2Forexample, an import of French wine involves a cost in convertible currency
as surely as an import of Canadian wheat or American cotton. This assertion im-
plicitly assumes the further condition that current-account balances between
Great Britain and France are not settled by short-term capital movements,
official or private, but rather that they are ultimately settled, whether through
the action of the market or the central banks, by the transfer of some other con-
vertible currency, such as dollars, or in gold. If this condition is realized, the
statement that British imports of French wine involve a cost in convertible cur-
rency or gold is valid whether Creat Britain has a deficit in its bilateral transac-
tions with France, which permits France on balance to convert sterling into dol-
lars or gold, or whether Great Britain has a surplus which France must settle by
converting gold or dollars into sterling.
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in applying their own import restrictions. In an effort to avoid this
deterioration, the newly convertible country might well narrow the
margin of discrimination by tightening up its restrictions on im-
ports from inconvertible countries.
The fear of some such sequence of events as this played an im-
portant role in the reaction of some of the continental EPU coun-
tries to the proposals for convertibility advanced by the British in
the spring of 1953, and, as Triffin has pointed out, led to their in-
sistence that convertibility must not mean abandonment of the
OEEC trade liberalization program. Thus it is entirely possible to
conceive of a situation in which the attainment of convertibility is
accompanied by agreement among a group of countries to continue
to discriminate in order to avert the danger of a wave of restriction.
Although currency convertibility removes the incentive for unilateral
discrimination on balance of payments grounds, it still leaves room
for discrimination by multilateral or bilateral agreement. (There
may, of course, be additional commercial reasons for discrimina-
tion.)
The question arises whether this narrow form of currency con-
vertibility, unaccompanied by any change in trade restrictions,
would serve any useful purpose. One of the major economic gains
to be derived from convertibility is a more efficient utilization of
economic resources in the world. If, however, the removal of cur-
rency restrictions is not accompanied or followed by any change in
trade restrictions, the flow of trade and the utilization of resources
will be unaffected. It is this consideration which has led Triffin, the
Randall Commission, and others to emphasize that convertibility,
to be meaningful and useful, must include nondiscrimination in
trade restrictions as well as in payments.
How are we to evaluate the second possibility, in which the newly
convertib].e country eliminatesdiscrimination by tightening its
restrictions on soft currency imports, while the remaining incon-
vertible countries reciprocate by restricting more severely their im-
ports from it? The chances are excellent that the flow of trade will
be reduced and the utilization of resources will become less effi-
cient (although this latter result is not inevitable). Thus when
convertibility and nondiscrimination are attained through the level-.
ing up of import restrictions, they are probably of negative value.
This consideration suggests that, in the appraisal of any move to-
ward "workable" convertibility, interest should not be confined to
the elimination of discrimination, but should extend to the level of
the restrictions.
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The foregoing discussion suggests that, if convertibility in the
technical financial sense is established under adverse conditions,
either trade restrictions will remain unchanged, in which case
nothing will be accomplished, or they may become more severe
(although lessdiscriminatory), which will probably represent
a retrograde step. The difficulty, when import restrictions are severe,
of measuring the latent demand for hard currency imports that is
repressed by those restrictions adds to the risk inherent in taking
large discontinuous steps toward convertibility under unfavorable
In any concerted effort to move away from a restrictive trade
and payments regime such as characterized the postwar period,
it is probably desirable that the establishment of currency converti-
bility be preceded by a gradual relaxation of discriminatory re-
strictions against hard currency imports. In this way the margin
of discrimination would be narrowed before the more drastic step
of establishing currency convertibility were ventured. In recent
years the trend has been precisely in this direction.
My second comment relates to the situation in which, after con-
vertibility has been attained, a severe decline in the imports of an
important trading country puts pressure on the balances of pay-
ments and income levels of other countries. The scarce currency
clause of the IMF agreement was designed to meet this situation,
which is usually associated with depression in the United States.
Triffin doubts the practical value of the scarce currency provision
and suggests an alternative approach drawn from the experience of
the EPU. Yet it is not entirely clear that his alternative will really
meet the situation. Some of the alternative's major elements seem to
apply to a quite different problem—the problem of a single deficit
country which falls into balance of payments difficulties for reasons
peculiar to itself—rather than to the problem of a large number of
countries in deficit because of a depression originating in a single
surplus country. It would certainly be highly unfortunate if, in re-
sponse to a decline in the level of economic activity and imports
of one country, the rest of the world immediately and automatically
applied discriminatory import restrictions against the depressed
It was widely reported that in March 1952, when the reserve crisis of 1951—
1952 was still in progress, the British government came within a "hair's breadth"
of making a "dash for convertibility," in the language of the London Economist
(November 15, 1952). Such action would presumably have been confinpd to the
currency field, and it might well have led to measures to make sterling scarcer by
tightening trade restrictions.
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country. It would be far preferable, if possible, to meet the situa-
tion by nonrestrictive measures. Nevertheless, if restrictions become
unavoidable, there is a strong case for the general principle that
restrictions limited to imports from the surplus country are prefer-
able to all-round restrictions. Whether the scarce currency provision
is a practicable and desirable method of applying this general prin-
ciple is, of course, another question.
Before we leave the subject of discriminatory trade restrictions, it
is worth noting that discrimination is a usual, if not inevitable, by-
product of "economic integration" of groups of countries. If two or
more countries reduce the economic barriers among themselves, in
connection with an agreement to coordinate their economic policies
(e.g. the Benelux Union, not fully implemented) or to establish a
unified market in a specified group of products (e.g. the Schuman
Plan), they will probably be unwilling to extend this liberalization to
the rest of the world. Such integration may well be desirable even
though it implies discrimination.
In his final section Triffin refers to the tendency for dollar short-
age to appear when the United States develops less inflationary pres-
sure, or greater deflationary pressure, than the rest of the world. He
appears to regard this tendency as sufficient explanation for the
dollar difficulties of the postwar period. While accepting it as an
extremely important element in the explanation, I should be in-
clined to give some weight to at least two additional factors, which
might be described as nonmonetary.4 The first is the impact of the
war on European capacity to produce and to earn foreign exchange.
The second is the effect of longer-term changes in the economic re-
lations between the older industrial areas of Western Europe and
the newer industrial and primary producing areas of the rest of the
world. It is at least a possibility worth considering, one which can
only be mentioned here without elaboration, that economic develop-
ment in the rest of the world has caused changes in the conditions
of international demand and supply which have been unfavorable to
Western Europe, at least in part and in their initial impact, and that
The distinction between "monetary" and "nonmonetary" factors is, of course,
notoriously treacherous. It could be argued, for example, that the "nonmonetary"
factors referred to here, although they would affect real incomes, would not give
rise to balance of payments deficits or dollar stringency if inappropriate "mone-
tary" policies did not prevent adjustment of the balance of payments. Whether
or not this contention is valid, our present concern is with the factors causing
the initial disequilibrium, not with the failure of the system to establish a new
equilibrium instantaneously. It is not believed that the use of the term "nonmone-
tary" will give rise to misunderstanding in the context of the present discussion.
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this unfavorable development has, for a variety of reasons, mani-
fested itself in the form of "dollar shortage" in the postwar period.
If this hypothesis has any validity, it would suggest that one of the
factors that determines the stability of the present state of interna-
tional balance is the extent to which the structure of world trade
has been readjusted in response to these long-term developments.
A familiar example of the kind of readjustment that has been re-
quired in the past in response to developments in the rest of the
world is the long-sustained decline in the share of British exports
represented by textiles, which began well back in the last century,
and the increase in the share represented by engineering products.
Triffin calls attention to the striking improvement in both the
magnitude and the distribution of the gold and dollar reserves held
outside the United States. While his observation is valid in geneial,
it should be noted that the distribution of reserves at the end of
195S was still not as favorable to the sterling area as might be con-
sidered desirable in relation to possible needs and commitments.
Nor, according to Table 1 in Triffin's paper, was it as favorable as
in 1938, when the sterling area held 28 per cent of the gold reserves
and dollar holdings outside the United States, as compared with 15
per cent at the end of The adequacy of sterling reserves is, of
course, of particular importance since current discussion of converti-
bility revolves around convertibility of sterling.
The Randall Commission and others have argued that the pres-.
ent state of world dollar balance conceals a substantial dollar gap
associated with the "extraordinary" dollar expenditures of the
United States government in foreign countries for defense purposes,
including stockpiling, offshore procurement, construction, and the
support of United States military establishments. Triffin rightly
points out that, unlike aid, these disbursements are not unilateral
transfers which are costless to the receiving country, since they
represent payment for currently produced goods and services. As
the disbursements decline (if they do), the resources producing'
the goods and services will be released and will become available
for other purposes, including support of the balance of payments
of the foreign country concerned. Although it is true that the re-
sources will be released, it does not by any means follow that they
can readily and smoothly be reabsorbed (as Triffin concedes). The
It should be added that official gold and dollar reserves of the United Kingdom
increased by a further half billion dollars between the end of 1953 and the middle
of 1954, and that the share of world reserves held by the United Kingdom in the
late thirties was considerably higher than in preceding periods.
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problem of adjustment will be aggravated because a high propor-.
tion of the extraordinary disbursements represent payment for such
services as housing and local labor supplied to United States es-
tablishments. In the case of services, it is particularly difficult to
see how the resources released can be redirected in such a way as
to fill the gap in the balance of payments arising from the loss of
these receipts.
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